SPCOMIT Seminar Invitation

Title: Semantic Security versus Active Eavesdroppers

Speaker: Ziv Goldfeld (BGU)

Abstract

Information theoretic security has adopted the weak- and strong-secrecy metrics as a standard for measuring security. Respectively, weak- and strong-secrecy refer to the normalized and unnormalized mutual information between the secret message and the channel symbol string observed by the eavesdropper. From a cryptographic point of view, however, both these metrics are insufficient to provide security of applications. Their main drawback lies in the assumption that the message is random and uniformly distributed, as real-life messages are neither (messages may be files, votes or any type of structured data, often with low entropy). Semantic-security (SS) is a cryptographic gold standard that demands negligible mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper’s observations even when maximized over all message distributions. Motivated to bridge some of the gaps between information theoretic security and cryptography, we adopt SS as our secrecy metric while considering scenarios with active eavesdroppers and incorporating channel uncertainty.

However, finding one sequence of codes that simultaneously satisfies the vanishing information leakage requirement for all message distributions requires stronger tools than currently available. To resolve this prerequisite we introduce a novel and stronger version of Wyner’s soft-covering lemma, which sharpen the claim by moving away from an expected value analysis. Instead, we show that a random codebook achieves the soft-covering phenomenon with probability that is doubly-exponentially (in the blocklength) close to 1. Through the union bound, this enables security proofs in settings where many security constraints must be satisfied simultaneously.

As a first application of the stronger soft-covering lemma we solve the open problem of the type II wiretap channel (WTC II) with a noisy main channel by deriving its SS-capacity and showing that it equals its weak-secrecy capacity. In this setting, the legitimate users communicate via a discrete-memoryless (DM) channel in the presence of an eavesdropper that has perfect access to a subset of its choosing of the transmitted symbols, constrained to a fixed fraction of the blocklength. The SS criterion demands negligible mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper’s observations for all possible eavesdropper subset choices and message distributions. Since the combined number of messages and subsets grows only exponentially with the blocklength, the stronger soft-covering lemma is sharp enough to imply the desired security performance. Another application is a single-letter characterization of the correlated-random-assisted SS-capacity of an arbitrarily varying wiretap channel with type constrained states. From a broader perspective, our methods lay the groundwork for showing the existence of codebooks that satisfy exponentially many constraints, a beneficial ability for many other applications in information theoretic security.

Ziv Goldfeld is a PhD student of Prof. Haim Permuter.

The seminar will take place on Sunday, 28-2-2016, 12:10, in room 102 building 33.